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Case No. 940218-CA 
Priority No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JTJRXSPICTIONAL STATEMENT ANP NATVRE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from the district court's trial de novo 
review of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission's informal 
adjudicative proceeding. The commission suspended Rainbow 
Trout's liquor license for five days and assessed $535 in 
administrative costs- On review, Third District Court Judge 
David S. Young overturned the commission's order and dismissed 
the administrative complaint. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(b)(i) (Supp. 
1993) . 
1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
When an administrative agency imposes disciplinary action 
against a licensee for conduct that violates the conditions of 
the license and the criminal law, is the agency's standard of 
proof a "preponderance of the evidence" or "beyond a reasonable 
doubt?" 
This issue was not preserved in the trial court because it 
did not arise until the court issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
STANDARD OF APPELATE REVIEW 
The appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of 
law for correctness of error. ffeiderhfryigey Bvilcterg Sfflfl 
Development Corp. v. Campbell. 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Other than the cases discussed in the brief, there are not 
determinative authorities pertinent to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On February 24, 1992, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control ("ABC") issued a Notice of Agency Action and 
Administrative Complaint against Rainbow Trout Inc.# dba Pop 
2 
Jenks ("Pop Jenks"). (R. at 1-21). The administrative complaint 
alleged that Pop Jenks, a private club, had served alcohol to two 
individuals who were neither members nor properly sponsored 
guests. (lii.) At an informal adjudicative hearing on March 26, 
1992, the Hearing Examiner found Pop Jenks guilty of the 
allegation and recommended a five-day suspension and payment of 
administrative costs of $535. (R. at 16-18). On April 24, 1992, 
the Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's recommendation and 
the imposed the recommended penalty. (R. at 20-21). 
On May 14, 1992, Pop Jenks filed a petition for review and 
trial de novo in Third District Court. (R. at 1-21). Judge David 
Young held an evidentiary hearing on February 14, 1994 and issued 
his memorandum decision on February 15, 1994. (R. at 143-47), The 
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Judgment on March 15, 1994. (R. at 163). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts is taken from the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
When the commission entered its order, Pop Jenks was a 
business establishment located in Park City, Utah. Pop Jenks had 
a private club liquor license. (R. at 2). On December 18, 1991, 
3 
two undercover agents entered Pop Jenks and requested service 
from a bartender. (Id.) The bartender asked the agents if they 
were members of the club and the agents replied that they were 
not. (Id.) The agents testified that the bartender told them 
"Steve is in the back room; he will sponsor you." (R. at 158). 
The agents never saw "Steve." (Id.) 
Steve Bennett, co-owner of the club, gave the bartender an 
"OK" sign with his hand as a sign of being willing to sponsor the 
individuals. The bartender then served them alcohol. IJd.) 
Neither Bennett nor the agents made any effort to meet. Based 
upon that conduct, the agents notified the ABC of the alleged 
violations and that agency subsequently issued an administrative 
complaint. In its memorandum decision the day after the 
evidentiary hearing, the lower court ruled that the ABC had 
failed to prove its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. at 
145; Attached as Addendum A). According to the court, it assumed 
that the burden of proof was "beyond a reasonable doubt" because 
all violations of the liquor laws constituted at least class B 
misdemeanors. (R. at 145; Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-104 (Supp. 
1993; Addendum A). The trial court concluded that the agency 
failed "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the agents were 
not sponsored guests under the provision of 32A-5-107"; 
4 
therefore, the trial court dismissed the administrative complaint 
and ordered the ABC to expunge from its records all references to 
the allegations. (R. at 159; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment, Attached as Addendum B) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court applied the wrong standard of proof in 
its review of ABCfs administrative action. Although the "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" standard would apply to any criminal 
prosecutions brought as a result of Pop Jenk!s conduct, that 
standard does not apply to action taken solely against the 
private club license. 
Fundamental respect for the liberty of individuals requires 
a stringent burden of proof in any case in which a person faces 
criminal punishment. The imposition of this burden upon the 
prosecution reflects the dire nature of the penalties that can 
occur if guilt is established. However important a private club 
license may be to running a profitable business though, the 
state's burden to support disciplinary action against that 
license is not similarly heavy. At most, the state is obligated 
to prove the allegations by a preponderance of evidence. 
The district court's action is manifestly erroneous. In 
analogous cases, the Utah Supreme Court has held that even though 
5 
the conduct forming the basis of a civil or administrative charge 
is criminal, the burden of proof before a civil or administrative 
tribunal is a "preponderance of the evidence". The record does 
not indicate whether the district court's decision would have 
been different had it viewed the evidence through the proper 
lens. However, due to the use of the incorrect evidentiary 
standard, this Court should remand this case to the Third 
District Court for either a new trial or for review by the court 
of the record, including the transcript, with the proper 
evidentiary standard in mind. 
THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVE CRIMINAL CONDUCT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT DOES NOT APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF LICENSING 
RULES OR CRIMINAL CONDUCT• 
in walker vf Bp^yd of Pardons, 803 p.2d 1241 (Utah 1990), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the burden of proof in 
administrative proceedings was "a preponderance of the evidence." 
Walker made a claim similar to that agreed to here by the 
district court: because his parole revocation was based on 
criminal conduct, either a criminal conviction or a standard of 
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" was necessary to support 
revocation. With no discussion except a brief reference to a 
6 
prior case, Jones v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986), 
the Walker court concluded that the criminal burden of proof was 
not applicable to administrative proceedings even if criminal 
conduct was the basis of the charge. 
The United States Supreme Court also has ruled that civil 
cases do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt even when 
criminal conduct is involved. In One Lot Emerald Cvt Stones vf 
United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1971), the Court distinguished 
between a criminal forfeiture, in which a forfeiture occurs as 
part of a criminal adjudication, and a civil forfeiture 
proceeding, in which property is forfeited in a hearing separate 
from the criminal action. When forfeiture occurs as a result of 
a criminal trial, essentially counting as part of the punishment, 
the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
However, in Emerald Stones, the proceeding at issue was a 
separate adjudication brought under the civil provisions of the 
forfeiture laws. id. Thus, the defendant's acquittal in the 
criminal case did not preclude civil forfeiture because of the 
difference in the standard of proof: "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
in the criminal action versus "preponderance of the evidence" in 
the civil. 
7 
Had Pop Jenks1 license-holder been subject to criminal 
prosecution and found guilty of a class B misdemeanor for 
violating the liquor laws, he or she could have faced six months 
imprisonment and a substantial fine. This substantial 
deprivation of liberty requires the heaviest burden of proof 
possible. However, in the actual administrative proceeding at 
issue here, Pop Jenks received a suspension of its ability to 
serve alcohol for five days. Though Pop Jenk's 
license is a property interest, applying a "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard is out of proportion to the potential sanction. 
CQNCLVSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request 
that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and remand 
the case to the Third District Court for further consideration 
under the appropriate standard of proof. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 0{ J day of July 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMA 4 hx*$\ 
James H. Beadl< Ja adles 
Assistant Attorney General 
8 
CERTIFICATE QF MfrlfrINg 
I certify that on the 3^ «/ day of July 1994, I caused to be 
mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to: 
Allan M. Metos 
Brickyard Towers -- Suite 250 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
* No 
fEB 15 m4 
^ C-'t of Summit C o o ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI& 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAINBOW TROUT, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba, POP JENKS, * 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, and DEPARTMENT OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
CASE #920311471 
This case comes before the court on a PETITION FOR REVIEW AND TRIAL DE 
NOVO requested by the plaintiff. The matter follows an informal hearing of March 26, 
1992 wherein Administrative Law Judge Richard R. Golden prepared FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS as to the plaintiffs alleged 
violations of it's private club liquor license requirements. 
The facts are that on the 18th of December 1991, agents Jody Dahl and Brad Blair 
entered Plaintiffs business and requested service. The bartender asked if they were 
members to which they said they were not. The bartender then sought sponsorship from an 
unidentified person in the club. That person responded that he could not since he was on 
duty at the time. The bartender then said "Steve/ who was in the back room, would 
sponsor them. The agents never saw "Steve." 
Steven Bennett testified that he was a co-owner of the business, that he was present 
on the occasion, and that he gave the bartender the "A-Okay" sign as being willing to 
sponsor the agents. Unfortunately, Mr. Bennett was not observed by the agents nor did the 
bartender make any effort to see that they knew who was sponsoring them. Mr. Bennett 
testified that from the office he was visible to the bartender but not to the patrons. The 
agents were thereafter served the drinks they ordered. 
Mr. Bennett testified that he maintained a record (Exhibit 5) of the sponsorships 
during the month of December in 1991 and even though the date column states the month as 
"2" or February, that in fact the document was prepared during December and should have 
read "12." Corresponding with the 18th of December (the date of the alleged offense) there 
is an entry that "Steve" sponsored "2" guests at "7:30" P.M., the time of the complained 
offense. 
Under 32A-5-107 UCA, as amended, we read in (7) "A private club may not sell 
alcoholic beverages to any person other than a member, guest, or visitor who holds a valid 
visitor card issued under Section (6)." No "visitor" card was purchased nor requested. 
Under (5) of the same section we read, "Each private club may allow guests or 
visitors to use the premises only when previously authorized by a member..." 
Plaintiff argues that the agents were "guests" authorized by Mr. Bennett. The term 
"guest" is defined in 32A-1-104 (18) UCA, as amended, to be "...a person accompanied by 
an active member or visitor of a club who enjoys only those privileges derived from the host 
for the duration of the visit to the club." 
The Plaintiff argues that the agents were sponsored guests. The agents argue that the 
"sponsorship" was a ruse or was non-existent. 
[2] 
Witness Mark Whittaker testified that he as worked in enforcement and investigations 
for some thirteen (13) years and has been the Officer in charge for two (2) years. He 
testified that the law is variously applied throughout the state and that in Park City, with a 
tourist trade, the clubs "sponsor" lots of "guests" for whom there is no prior acquaintance. 
In fact, some clubs keep a member present to "sponsor" "guests" so that they don't have to 
become "visitors" which requires purchase of a temporary membership. 
The statute says nothing about the relationship, if any, that must exist between a 
"sponsor" and a "guest." 
Since section 32A-12-104 UCA, as amended, makes violation of the liquor laws a 
Class B Misdemeanor and since the sections incorporate Title 76 involving the Utah Criminal 
Code provisions into the liquor enforcement provisions, the court assumes that the standard 
of proof in this case is "beyond a reasonable doubt." That being so, the court concludes that 
there remains a reasonable doubt as to whether the agents were in fact "sponsored." There 
can be no doubt that the matter was discussed and the bartender indicated that the agents 
were being "sponsored" by "Steve." Steve testified that he did so and while the evidence is 
unfortunately vague if not inaccurate, the court finds that there remains sufficient question as 
to compliance that the court must find for the plaintiff and against the defendant. The Court 
finds that the complaint filed against the Plaintiff should be and is hereby dismissed. 
Mr. Metos is requested to prepare FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, and an ORDER OF DISMISSAL consistent herewith and with the pleadings and 
[3] 
evidence introduced. 
Dated, February 15, 1994 
ex. to Counsel 
^COUNTY Mf 
' ' 'MllHM**** 
[4] 
Case No: 920311471 AA 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the /5"U day of <&& 19W 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
RAINBOW TROUT INC 
Plaintiff 
UT ST DEPT ALCOHOLIC BEV CONTR 
Defendant 
PBP JENKS 
Doing Business As 
ALLAN M METOS 
Atty for Plaintiff 
1245 EAST BRICKYARD ROAD 
SLC UT 84106 
BETSY L ROSS 
Atty for Defendant 
4120 STATE OFFICE BLDG 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114 
District Court Clerk 
By: C W /). /PlAZtf 
U U Deputy Clerk 
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ADDENDUM B 
ALLAN M. METOS - 2249 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Brickyard Tower Suite 250 
1245 East Brickyard Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 467-1555 
NO. F I L E D 
N&R !§'£••* 
#1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo 
RAINBOW TROUT, INC. 
Plaintifff 
v. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 920311471 AA 
Honorable David S. Young 
—oooOooo—•• 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial this 15th day of 
February, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young, one of the 
judges of the above entitled court. 
The Plaintiff was represented by Counsel Allan M. Metos 
and Defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General, Betsy 
L. Ross. 
The Plaintiff introduced its evidence and rested, 
Defendant introduced its evidence and rested, the evidence closed, 
and the Court being fully advised in the premises made the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On the 18th day of December, 1991, two undercover 
agents entered Plaintiff's private club, known as Pop Jenks, 
located in Pack City, Utah. 
2. The liguor control agents requested service from a 
bartender who wore a beverage control badge with the name of 
"Aldis." 
3. Aldis asked the agents if they were members of the 
club, to which they replied they were not. 
4. Under Utah Code Ann. S 32A-5-107, a private club may 
not sell alcoholic beverages to any person other than a member, 
guest or a visitor with a valid visitor card. Violation of said 
statute is a Class B misdemeanor under Utah law. The State is 
required to prove guilt in a Class B misdemeanor "beyond a 
reasonable doubt.H 
5. Said agents were not members of the club and a valid 
visitor's card was not issued nor was one requested by the agents. 
6. The only other provision for entrance and use of a 
private club under Utah law is the sponsored guest provision of the 
statute. The agents' own report states that the bartender sought 
sponsorship for the two agents from an undisclosed person in the 
club. That person responded that he could not sponsor the agents 
since he was on duty. The agent's report states the undisclosed 
2 
a\rain-ut*h.fin 
person said "Steve is in the back room; he will sponsor you.M The 
agents who were seated at the bar with their backs to the office 
back room stated they never saw "Steve." 
7• Steve Bennett, co-owner of the club was not on duty 
that day, but was in the club's office using the phone to book a 
fishing trip to New Zealand. Steve gave the bartender, Aldis, an 
"OK" sign with his hand as a sign as being to willing to sponsor 
the agents. The agents were then served a drink. 
8. Neither Mr. Bennett nor the agents made any effort 
to meet each other or determine sponsorship. 
9. The two agents were visible to Mr. Bennett, but Mr. 
Bennett was not visible to the two agents who were at the bar with 
their back to Mr. Bennett and his office. 
10. The statute requiring sponsorship does not define or 
make any reference to the relationship, if any, that must exist 
between a "sponsor and a guest." The customary private club 
practice in the Park City area entails the sponsorship of a great 
number of guests by club members who have no prior acquaintance 
with said guest, according to the Defendant's witnesses, Blair and 
Whitaker. 
11 • The statutes involved do not require a written 
record be kept by the club showing sponsorship, nor that any prior 
relationship be in existence to sponsor membership. 
3 
a\rain-ut*h.fin 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court made the 
following conclusions of law. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The Utah State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control has 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that said agents were not 
sponsored guests under the provision of 32A-5-107, and for that 
reason the complaint of the Utah State Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control against Plaintiff should be dismissed with 
prejudicef no cause of action. Each party to bear their own costs. 
DATED this 
VSA COUNTY jto/ 
** 
a\rtln-utah.fin 4 
No, 
ALLAN M. METOS - 2249 F I L E D 
Attorney for Plaintiff "^ 
Brickyard Tower Suite 250 
1245 East Brickyard Road MAR 15 1994 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 467-1555 <**ofSummhcWy J 
* ^ vGt^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—-oooOooo---
RAINBOW TROUT, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
ORDER 
Case No. 920311471 AA 
Honorable David S. Young 
Defendant. 
—— oooOooo 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing on the 
15th day of February, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young, 
one of the judges of the above entitled court, on the motion of 
Defendant Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to dismiss 
Plaintiff's complaint on the ground said complaint was moot under 
Utah law. The Plaintiff was represented by Counsel Allan M. Metos 
and Defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General Betsy 
L. Ross, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, having 
read Defendant's memorandum of law and supplemental memorandum of 
law and Plaintiff's response to the same, made the following 
findings of fact: 
1. All dispositive motions under the provisions of Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(g) must be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the trial date. Defendant's motion 
to dismiss was filed less than thirteen (13) days before the 
scheduled trial date, and is deemed untimely. 
2. The Plaintiff in this matter has requested the 
removal of Plaintiff's conviction by the Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control, which is made part of the findings of fact in all 
proceedings before the Commission. The removal of such a violation 
from the record does offer the Court, if it chooses, the ability to 
offer effectual relief to the aggrieved party. 
3. The right of judicial review should not be defeated 
by short-term orders rescinding operation of Plaintiff's license, 
capable of repetition by Defendant, yet evading review. A series 
of suspension orders of less than twenty (20) days, as reflected in 
the presiding hearing officer's recommendation in this matter to 
the Liquor Commission, is too short to make effectual judicial 
review possible during the life of the suspension order. 
4. The Court is familiar with the provision Utah Code 
Ann. S 63-46b-15(l)(a), and the recent Utah Court of Appeals 
decision, Cordova v. Blackstock, 224 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Nov 2, 
1944), both of which require the Court not only to review the 
informal administrative proceeding but to also hold a new trial. 
Based on the above findings of fact, the Court made the 
following order. 
2 
aNxmin-ut&h.ord 
BOOKQQPAGE 6 4 5 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds 
said complaint was moot; be and the same is hereby denied. 
DATED t h i s *£•£, - * ^ ~ day of j£ }MNMMry, 1994 
/v? 
•\*ain-utah.ord 
nnWAAWfiF feitfe 
ALLAN M. METOS - 2249 F 1 L t U 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Brickyard Tower Suite 250 MAD 1 *; VM4 
1245 East Brickyard Road W A K iD ™ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 r ^ •* SommH C***V 
Telephone: (801) 467-1555 ^ ,„„w# 
* •»'*** 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
- — o o o O o o o — 
RAINBOW TROUT, INC, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 920311471 AA 
Honorable David S. Young 
Defendant• 
- — o o o O o o o — 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial this 15th day of 
February, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young, one of the 
judges of the above entitled court. 
The Plaintiff was represented by Counsel Allan M. Metos 
and Defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General, Betsy 
L. Ross. 
The Plaintiff introduced its evidence and rested, 
Defendant introduced its evidence and rested, the evidence closed, 
and the Court being fully advised in the premises having heretofore 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and good cause 
appearing therefore made the following decree: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Utah 
State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control's complaint filed 
against the Plaintiff, Rainbow Trout, Inc., (Pop Jenks), in Case 
BnwnnPAftP kk? 
No. 92-030L be and the same is dismissed with prejudice, no cause 
of action. Each party to bear their own costs and attorney fees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that all reference to above 
hearing and conviction before said DABC Administrative Hearing 
Board be expunged from the records of the Plaintiff, Rainbow Trout 
dba Pop Jenks within ten (10) days of the date of this order. 
DATED this l*> day of March, 1994. 
£\ COUNTY /?/ 
'"'/ft 'MHIMtV 
•\rtia-utah.jud 
Bomcn r\ our* l i r\ 
